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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of CORA E. FENNER., 
Deceased. 
Case No. 8474 
APPELLANT'S. BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF· FACTS 
Mrs. Cora E. Fenner was, at the time of her death 
in an Ogden hospital on F'ebruary 10, 1952, beneficiary 
of the proceeds of three life insurance policies taken out 
on the life of her deceased husband, Walter E. Fenner. 
These policies were written by the Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society of the United ·states, hereinafter referred 
to as "the Society." Each of these policies contained an 
identical "Special Provision" which gave Mrs. F'enner 
several choices as to the method of payment of the 
amounts "held on deposit" for her (Exhibit 1, P. 4). 
The Society accepted proof of the death of Walter E. 
Fenner on the 28th day of December, 1951, and the 28th 
of each month was thereafter treated as the "interest due 
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date" within the terms of payment on the policies. The 
policies provided for payment of the "amount becoming 
due" on "the amount held on deposit." (Exhibits 1, 2(b), 
P. 4). Pursuant to this clause, the Society mailed to Cora 
E. Fenner two checks, the first in the amount of $64.80 
dated the 24th day of J anua.ry, 1952, as payment for 
interest due on the amounts held on deposit with the 
Society as proceeds of the three policies from the date 
of the decedent's death, November 19, 1951, to the first 
interest due date, December 28th, 1951; the second check 
for $5'2.65 dated January 28, 1952, was payment for the 
interest due on the deposits from December 28, 1951 to 
J anua.ry 28, 1952. No demand was ever made for pay-
ment and the checks representing the amount due on the 
amounts held on deposit were sent to her as of course. 
On January 2nd, 1952, Cora E. F'enner withdrew the 
/ sums held on deposit with the Society under two other 
policies identical except as to the amounts. Inheritance 
tax was paid on these sums without protest. (Except 
where otherwise designated, the State of Fiacts supra 
is taken from the Stipulation of the parties which was 
entered into the Record on Appeal by Order of this 
Court on the lOth day of October, 1953.) 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The position of the Utah State Tax Commission is 
that Mrs. F·enner clearly had the absolute use of and 
title to the amounts "held on deposit" which were "due" 
(Ex. 1, P. 4, 6) and "payable" (Ex. 1, P. 3) and the mere 
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fact that she chose not to withdraw the sums and con-
suine them for her own objects, but rather elected to 
have the sums paid over upon her death to the named 
nieces and nephews, (who received the same proportion-
ate share either under her will or as contingent bene-
ficiaries under the policies [Stipulation, Par. 8 and 
Exhibit Two]), should not affect her duty to pay the tax 
due on all property which she owned. We contend that 
1\irs. Cora E. Fenner was the owner of the proceeds with 
no restriction on the use thereof, and that these proceeds 
should have been included in the inventory as part of 
her gross estate. 
POINT I. 
MRS. CORA E. FENNER WAS AT THE TIME OF HER 
DEATH OWNER IN FEE OF THE PROCEEDS OF THREE 
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES WHICH SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN INVENTORIED WITH HER OTHER ASSETS AS 
PART OF HER GROSS ESTATE, AS PROVIDED IN TITLE 
59-12-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953). 
(A) WHETHER THE ESTATE CREATED IN MRS. 
CORA E. FENNER IS DEEMED BY THIS COURT A FEE 
SIMPLE ABSOLUTE WITH VOID REMAINDER OVER, OR 
A FEE SIMPLE DEFEASIBLE, SUCH ESTATE IS WITHIN 
THE PURVIEW OF OUR INHERITANCE TAX STATUTE. 
Any litigation involving estates gives rise to the 
problems of semantics. The Minute Entry of the District 
Court does not set forth the grounds for the exclusion 
from the inventory of the amounts held on deposit by 
the Society. Thus the task falls to this Court to append 
a legal label to the estate created by the insurance con-
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tract, which is set forth in full in the Record on Appeal. 
The Commission submits, however, that whichever of the 
possible and plausible labels chosen, the particular 
interest or estate created upon the death of Walter E. 
Fenner falls within the purview of our inheritance tax 
statute. 
Our Utah statute setting forth the property to be 
included in the evaluation of a decedent's gross estate 
reads: 
59-12-3. 
"Gross estate, how determined-Election by 
executor.-The value of the gross estate of a 
decedent shall be determined by including the 
value at the time of his death, or as of a time nine 
months after his death whichever the executor 
within ten months after such death elects by filing 
an election with the clerk of the district court and 
the tax commission, of all properly, real or per-
sonal, within the jurisdiction of this state, and 
any interest therein, whe:ther tangible or intangi-
ble, which shall pass to any person, in trust or 
otherwise, by testamentary disposition or by law 
of inheritance or succession of this or any other 
state or country, or by deed, grant, bargain, sale 
or gift made in contemplation of the death of the 
grantor, vendor or donor, or intended to take 
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his 
death. Provided, ( 1) property included in the 
gross estate on the date of death and, within nine 
months after the decedent's death, distributed by 
the executor or sold, exchanged, or otherwise dis-
posed of, shall be included at its value as of the 
time of such distribution, sale, exchange, or other 
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disposition, whichever first occurs, instead of its 
value as of the date nine months after the dece-
dent's death, and (2) any interest or estate which 
is affected by mere lapse of time shall be included 
at its value as of the time of death (instead of the 
later date), with adjustment for any difference in 
its value as of the later date not due to mere lapse 
of time. No deduction under this title of any 
item shall be allowed if allowance for such item 
is in effect given by the valuation under this sub-
division. Wherever in any other section of this 
chapter reference is made to the value of prop-
erty at the time of the decedent's death, such 
reference shall be deemed to refer to the value 
of such property used in determining the value 
of the gross estate." (Emphasis added) 
There can be no dispute that the legislature intended 
to include all legal estates in realty and personalty which 
were not otherwise exempt. It would also seem abun-
dantly clear that the interest of Mrs. F'enner, however 
characterized, was within the provisions of this statute. 
The insurance contract may have created in the 
beneficiary either (a) a title in fee simple; or (b) a title 
in fee simple defeasible. The Restatement of Property 
defines an Estate in Fee Simple as one which, 
"(a) has a duration 
(i) potentially infinite; or 
( ii) terminable upon an event which is cer-
tain to occur but is not certain to occur within a 
fixed or computable period of time or within the 
duration of any specified life or lives; or 
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(iii) terminable upon an event which is cer-
tain to occur, provided such estate is one left in 
the conveyor, subject to defeat upon the occur-
rence of the stated event in favor of a person 
otherthantheconveyor;and 
·(b) if limited in favor of a natural person, 
would be inheritable by his collateral as well as 
by his lineal heirs." (A.L.I. Restatement of Prop-
erty, ·sec. 14.) 
The interest Mrs. Fenner took falls within this 
definition, although it may be argued that her failure 
to designate one of the optional modes of payment 
amounted to a failure to perfect her fee. Clearly, had 
she made the positive move of withdrawing the amounts 
held on deposit, her estate would be required to account 
therefor. By their conduct in paying without protest 
inheritance tax on the two other identical policies, the 
proceeds of which were consumed by Mrs. F·enner, coun-
sel thus admit this point. The distinction then between a 
fee absolute and the interest Mrs. Fenner took is the 
artificial one that she omitted to notify the Society of 
her desires to withdraw the funds "held on deposit." 
She had all of the perquisites of a fee holder, viz., 
she had the right and power to sell or assign her interest 
or spend the amount on deposit at any time with no 
restrictions. (The administrative limitation requiring 
her to give notice of withdrawal prior to an interest due 
date is not material here.) In addition, the interest 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
accruing on the amounts "held on deposit" was paid to 
her as a rna tter of course. 
An equally tenable construction would be that the 
interest which Mrs. Fenner took was an estate in Fee 
Simple Defeasible. The Restatement of Property defines 
such an interest as : 
"An estate in fee simple which is subject to 
a special limitation, a condition subsequent, an 
executory limitation, or a combination of such 
restrictions." (A.L.I. Restatement of Property, 
Sec. 16.) 
Notwithstanding the intent of the husband, Walter 
E. F·enner, to create a given interest, if the grant to his 
widow was - as we_ submit is the case - absolute, any 
subsequent attempted' grant of a contingent remainder 
to the named nieces and nephews must be treated as a 
nullity and void. (Inheritance and Estate Taxes, Pinker-
ton and Millsaps, Sec. 17 4, p·. 139 (1952).) 
S.UMMARY 
Thus, this court may construe the interest created 
in Mrs. Cora E. F·enner as either a Fee Simple Absolute 
with a void remainder over or as a Fee Simple Defeasible 
-defeasible upon her failure to withdraw, assign, con-
sume or otherwise dispose of the principal held on 
deposit. Upon either hypothesis our statute (Title 59-12-
3, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) encompasses within its 
terms the particular estate created. 
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(B) OUR INHERITANCE TAX STATUTE IS TO BE 
CONSTRUED SO AS TO BE "FAIR AND REASONABLE" 
AND ANY CONSTRUCTION WHICH EXCLUDES SUCH 
INTERESTS AS THOSE OF THE DECEDENT IN THE PRO-
CEEDS O·F THESE POLICIES WOULD RENDER PARTS OF 
THE STATUTE NUGATORY AND, HENCE, WOULD BE 
NEITHER FAIR NOR REASONABLE. 
The statute which must be construed in the deter-
mination of this case (Title 59-12-3, Utah Code Anno-
tated, ( 1953) reads, in part: 
"The value of the gross estate of a decedent 
shall be determined by including * * * all prop-
erty real or personal * * * or any interest thereirn, 
whether tangible or intangible, which shall pass 
to any person in trust or otherwise * * * intended 
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or 
after death." (Emphasis added) 
To exclude the interest Mrs. F'enner took as bene-
ficiary of the three policies would be to ignore, for exam-
ple, such phrases as "any interest" and "tangible or 
intangible." 
The Supreme Court of this state held in the case of 
In re Osgood's Estate, (52 Utah 185 at 195, 173 Pac. 152 
( 1918) ) , that : 
"While w~ are aware of and approve the 
geperal rule that a law which imposes a tax of any 
kind or character cannot be extended by construc-
tion beyond the literal terms of the statute * * * 
At all events the inheritance tax statute of this 
state should receive a fair and reasonable· con-
struction both in favor of the state and against 
•t" 1 • 
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See Also, Norville vs. Sta.te Ta.x Commission, 98 
U t. 170, 97 P 2d 937 ( 1940) ; and Sutherlan,d, 
Infra, Sec. 6703 and 6710. 
"It is the policy of the law to insure the col-
lection of all taxes and whenever it is possible on 
any theory to do so, the courts will construe the 
statutes to accomplish that result." Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction, (3rd Ed.) Vol. 3, Sec. 
6706, p. 302 and cases cited thereat. 
(C) THE LANGUAGE OF THE POLICIES CLEARLY 
INDICATES THAT MRS. CORA E. FENNER TOOK TITLE 
IN FEE TO THE PROCEEDS OF THE POLICIES. 
One of the more compelling reasons sustaining the 
commission's position that the interest created in ~Irs. 
Fenner is includable in her gross estate is sin1ply that 
the unambiguous language of the insurance contract 
itself so establishes. Throughout the policy and its 
several addenda the proceeds are referred to as being 
"due" (Exhibit one, p. 4, par. 2 and 2 (b) ; p. 6), "pay-
able" (Exhibit one, p. 3), "held on deposit" (Exhibit One, 
p. 4, par. 2 (b)), and "left on deposit" (Exhibit One, p. 
4, par. 2; p. 6, par. 1). Such phrases are inconsistent with 
any other conclusion than that Mrs. F·enner was absolute 
owner of the proceeds. 
Perhaps the most explicit statement establishing title 
in Mrs. Fenner is found in Exhibit One, p. 3, which reads: 
"This policy having matured by the death 
of the insured, the net proceeds, to-wit: TEN 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIR.TY ONE 
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and 92/100 DOLLARS ($10,351.92) ha,ve become 
p·ayable as provided in the policy." (Emphasis 
Added). 
It has been held by many courts that the word "Due" 
means owing and immediately payable, i.e., that the per-
son to whom something is "Due" is the owner of the 
property and has ti tie to the res. 
See e.g., Barnk of America Nat. Trust and Sav. 
Ass'n. v. Gillett, 36 Cal. App. 2d 453, 97 P. 2d 
875 (1940); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Greiner, 115 Mich. 639, 74 N.W. 187 (1898). 
"Due means having reached the date at which 
payment is required; payable; said especially of 
a note or obligation in which the time for payment 
is specified." Syl. 5, 56 Ariz. 247, 107 P. 2d 212 
(1940). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Tax Commission submits that our 
Utah inheritance tax statute by its express terms covers 
the estate granted to Mrs. F·enner-however that estate 
may be characterized by this Court. The intended cover-
age and scope of the statute- as drawn from the plain 
meaning of the words themselves - compels the inclu-
sion of such an estate within the inventory of a decedent's 
gross assets. Furthermore, the insurance contract itself 
in using language as "due" "payable" and "held on 
deposit", seems clearly to create an interest in the 
deposited sums akin to an ordinary bank deposit. Indeed, 
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banks often require notice of withdrawal as a condition 
to the maintenance of such accounts-much as was pro-
vided for in the policies in issue. 
It is submitted, therefore, that Mrs. F·enner was the 
owner of the proceeds of the life insurance policies on 
the life of her husband, Walter E. Fenner, and the Dis-
trict Court erred in failing to order their inclusion within 
the inventory of Mrs. F:enner's gross estate. 
C. PRE·STON ALLEN, 
ADAM M. DUNCAN, 
Attovrneys for .Apvellant, 
Utah State Tax Commission 
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